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1.   Introduction
Liberalization of international trade was the centerpiece of the package of economic
reforms undertaken by many less developed countries (LDCs) in the 1980s and 1990s.  To date,
the results of those reforms have been considered disappointing in terms of generating higher
and more rapid growth of incomes in most of the reformers (Easterly 2001).  A consensus has
now emerged that a “second generation” of “institutional” reforms is necessary for the earlier
reforms to have their expected impact, but as yet there is no consensus on how these institutions
interact with trade liberalization or which should have priority for reform.  Chang, Kaltani, and
Loayza (2005) survey this literature and provide evidence from cross-country regressions that
the interactions of trade openness with a number of different measures of infrastructure and
institutions are positively associated with economic growth.  Bolaky and Freund (2004) find that
trade does not stimulate growth in economies that are heavily regulated, as measured using the
Doing Business database.  
This paper seeks to connect this literature to a parallel micro-level literature that
examines the impact of exporting at the firm level and has, in its own way, also yielded
disappointing results.  The starting point for this literature was a well-established positive
correlation between export market participation and firm productivity (and other “good” firm
attributes, especially size).  It was hoped that this correlation resulted from technology transfer
or “learning by exporting.”  Beginning with Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998), however, most
panel econometric studies have found that exporting does not increase firm productivity. 2
1Some recent studies do in fact find evidence for learning by exporting, but none of these studies
finds evidence against the selection mechanism described below.  Fernandes and Isgut (2004, p.
2), who list these studies, point out that “self-selection and learning-by-exporting are not
mutually exclusive possibilities, as high-productivity firms that can afford the sunk cost of entry
to export markets may, in principle, continue to improve their productivity as a result of their
exposure to exporting.”
2A review of World Bank trade reform efforts from 1987 to 2004 found “rather modest export
supply responses” (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2006, p. 40).
Instead, firms that are already more productive self-select into exporting, yielding the observed
cross-sectional correlation.
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Does this mean that, for LDCs, the export market is no different from any other market? 
No, because success in the export market requires products of higher quality than those
demanded in the domestic market.  This is the message of studies at the firm level, including
Brooks (2006) and Verhoogen (2006), and of studies of bilateral trade, such as Hallak (2006).  It
follows that we can expect little impact from reducing the anti-export bias of the economy if few
firms are capable of producing goods of high (export) quality.
2
This brings us back to the issue of institutional reform.  Dixit (2004, Chapter 3) has
shown how, in the area of contract enforcement, informal “institutions” (reputation) become
inadequate once the economy grows beyond a certain size or complexity, after which formal-
legal methods of contract enforcement are needed.  It is not hard to see how his insight can be
applied to the distinction between high- and low-quality production.  High-quality production,
especially for export, requires that certain standards be met, e.g., for pesticide residues in
processed food or metal composition for medical instruments.  High-quality producers depend on
their suppliers in order to meet these standards.  They must be confident that they can reject sub-
standard shipments from their suppliers without interminable court battles, or else they may have3
3This argument is consistent with the results of Levchenko (forthcoming), who finds that
countries with strong contract enforcement have a comparative advantage in goods requiring
many intermediates in production.
4Most programs to support SMEs are more accurately viewed as subsidies rather than as
efficiency-enhancing institutional reforms, and as such need to be justified by the presence of a
distortion in the economy, such as one that creates unemployment.  This is also true for programs
to integrate backwards – a significant barrier to entry.
3  Other institutional deficiencies can also
pose barriers to entry for high-quality producers, especially insofar as they tend to be larger than
low-quality producers.  Bhidé (2004) notes that poor record-keeping means that land parcels in
Bangalore, India often lack clean titles, potentially a much greater obstacle to a high-quality
producer looking for a large, greenfield site for its plant.  Laeven and Woodruff (2006) use data
from a survey of lawyers in Mexico to show that firms are larger in states where the quality of
the legal system is higher.
In contrast, governments and international development organizations have placed a great
deal of emphasis on improving institutions that serve small- and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), which tend not to be export-oriented and probably tend to produce relatively low-
quality output.  Reform of domestic lending practices to make credit more available to SMEs has
been most prominent on this agenda,  but there are many other initiatives such as programs that 
provide technology and marketing support (see, e.g., Beyene 2002).  In principle, entrepreneurs
who might have been willing to incur the high startup costs of large, export-oriented, high-
quality production firms could choose to aim lower given the availability of such programs.  I
recognize, however, that some of the rationale for support of SMEs is employment generation
rather than enhancing the benefits from trade liberalization, and take up the issue in that context
in section 5 below.
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specifically designed to help SMEs upgrade from low-quality production for the domestic
market to high-quality production for export.  Our argument regarding synergy pertains to
efficiency-enhancing reforms, not subsidies, and prior to section 5 our model is constructed to
avoid distortions.
5For a list of empirical studies finding that trade liberalization raises within-industry productivity
in LDCs, see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004, p. 21).
In short, trade liberalization has more impact when there are more export-quality
producers, and institutional/regulatory reform that reduces obstacles to formation of firms
capable of export-quality production has more impact when trade reform reduces anti-export
bias.  The impact of either policy reform without the other is limited.  
In the next three sections of this paper I develop a model that yields these results while at
the same time capturing the main features of the firm-level trade literature:  self-selection of the
most productive and largest firms into export-oriented, high-quality production; vertical
differentiation of demand into low-quality, domestic and high-quality, (primarily) foreign; and
industry “rationalization” effects from trade liberalization.
5  In section 5 I extend the model to
cover foreign direct investment and domestic unemployment.  Throughout, institutional reforms
will simply be reflected in reductions in the fixed costs of entering high- or low-quality
production; more detailed modeling will have to wait for research to pin down more decisively
the institutions involved.  Our aim is to show how changes in the costs of starting high- and low-
quality producers, which can be attributed to institutional reforms, interact with trade
liberalization in a model that captures the features of LDC economies found in the firm-level
trade literature.5
6Hallward-Driemeier, Iarossi, and Sokoloff (2002) show, for five East Asian countries, that firms
that began as exporters differ systematically in the training of their work forces, the vintage of
their capital equipment, the use of auditing, and other aspects of their production processes and
operations, all of which is consistent with the need for these firms to achieve higher quality.
2.   The model
Our model of self-selection of LDC firms into high-quality production for developed
country markets is in the spirit of recent panel econometric studies that show a surge in
investment prior to the start of exporting (Alvarez and López 2005, Lebedeva 2005).  The
authors interpret their findings as evidence that firms planning to export to developed countries
first invest in raising the quality of their products.   Their findings thus suggest that the main
fixed cost of entering export markets is investment in raising quality, rather than the cost of
exporting per se.  I will simply assume that firms that produce high-quality goods gain access to
more developed country markets, so that separate decisions are not made regarding whether to
become a high-quality producer and whether to become an exporter.  This modeling choice was
also influenced by my interviews with CEOs of food-product exporters in Beirut during the first
half of 2005.  I learned that exporting was crucial to sustaining producers of high-quality goods
because of their need to spread out their higher overhead relative to producers of low-quality
goods.  In other words, in LDCs the domestic market for high-quality goods is often too small to
justify the investment in fixed assets and non-production staff necessary for high-quality
production.  For entrepreneurs in this situation, becoming a high-quality producer and becoming
an exporter are decided jointly.
6  I therefore leave to future research construction of a model
where some high-quality producers do not have access to more developed country markets.6
7Allowing for imports of low-quality goods with which domestic producers have to compete
would reinforce the results of this paper.  Trade liberalization that lowered the cost of imported
low-quality goods would have a greater impact on real income per capita if there were more
firms producing high-quality goods and fewer firms producing low-quality goods, since the
benefit to domestic consumers would be greater relative to the loss to domestic producers.
In other respects the model I construct builds upon ideas from Lucas (1978), Manasse
and Turrini (2001), and Yeaple (2005).  All three of these other papers postulate a distribution of
talent across agents in the economy.  In the models of Manasse and Turrini and of Yeaple, there
are fixed costs of entry into the export market and the most talented agents will self-select into
exporting.  I will adopt the competitive market structure of Lucas rather than the
monopolistically competitive market structure of Manasse and Turrini and of Yeaple.  None of
these models has a vertically differentiated demand structure that makes high quality a necessity
for exporting.  Ultimately, however, the differences between the issues addressed by this paper
and those addressed by Lucas, Manasse and Turrini, and Yeaple are larger than the differences
between the models.
Our model LDC has a population of mass N in which every agent is endowed with
entrepreneurial talent z drawn from a fixed distribution F:  ú
+ 6 [0,1], as in Lucas (1978).  I also
follow Lucas in assuming that entrepreneurial talent is irrelevant for employees (workers are
homogeneous).  Each agent has a choice of three careers:  (1) he can become an employee and
earn the prevailing wage w; (2) he can found and manage a firm that produces low-quality
goods; or (3) he can found and manage a firm that produces high-quality goods.  Low-quality
goods are nontraded and high-quality goods are traded.
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8The absence of distortions associated with a competitive market structure greatly simplifies the
analysis of the impact of trade liberalization and institutional reforms on income in section 4
below.
Productivity in this country is a function of cumulative production experience per capita
.  We will discuss the growth of  in section IV.  For now,  is a constant that plays no Q Q Q
role in our analysis.
An agent with entrepreneurial talent z who chooses to become an entrepreneur producing
low-quality goods must pay a fixed cost wCL and thereby gain access to the production function
(1),  qQ fz LL = (,) l
where R is variable labor input and fL is linear homogeneous in z and R.  He chooses R to maximize
profits given by pLqL - w(R + CL), where pL is the price of low-quality goods that clears the
domestic market.  The result can easily be shown to be given by a profit function
AL = zBL(pL,w; ) - wCL (2), Q
where the function BL is decreasing and convex in w and linear homogeneous in  and w (and Q
in pL and w).
Some preliminary discussion is necessary before deriving the parallel profit function for
producers of high-quality goods.  The high quality manufactured product is treated as having a
price p
*
H determined on world markets, and hence is assumed to be a perfect substitute for export-
quality goods produced by other less developed countries.  Opportunities for product
differentiation are limited because LDC exporters typically do not sell to more developed
country consumers under their own brand names (Gereffi 1994, 1999).
8  We have in mind8
9In this section there are no market failures in our model, hence no policy motivation for trade
taxes or subsidies.
instead the case where the marketing of products of LDC exporters to more developed country
consumers is handled by MDC manufacturers, for which the LDC exporters play the role of
“original equipment manufacturer” (OEM), or the case where the marketing of the LDC
exporters’ products is handled by MDC retailers under their “private labels.”  However, the LDC
exporters must still bear the costs of shipment to their MDC buyers, which includes not only
transportation costs but also communication costs involved in coordinating shipments with the
buyers’ needs.  We model these costs as “melting” of exports, and assume in particular that for
each unit shipped only a proportion D < 1 reaches an MDC buyer.  The equilibrium domestic
price for the LDC exporters is then pH = Dp
*
H.  Finally, we will model the impact of “trade
liberalization” as being transmitted entirely by increases in D or, equivalently, increases in pH. 
By, in effect, restricting trade liberalization to reductions in communication and transportation
costs, we avoid having to keep track of revenues from trade taxes (or expenditures from trade
subsidies), which would clutter our model without yielding any additional insight from its
analysis.
9
An agent with entrepreneurial talent z who chooses to become an entrepreneur producing
high-quality goods must pay a fixed cost wCH, CH > CL, and thereby gain access to the
production function
(3),  qQ f z HH = (,) l
where the notation follows equation (1).  Profit maximization yields the profit function
AH = zBH(w;pH, ) - wCH (4), Q9
10Figure 1 is very similar to Figure 1 in Yeaple (2005), and both are examples of the Roy model
of selection.  In Yeaple’s model high-technology (rather than high-quality) producers attract
more talented workers (there are no entrepreneurs in his model).  High-technology, exporting
firms therefore pay higher wages.  However, Fafchamps (2006) finds, using a panel of matched
employer-employee data for Morocco, that the higher wages paid by exporting firms can be
explained entirely by their larger size and greater capital intensity.
where the function BH has the properties of the function BL, mutatis mutandis.  I assume BH > BL
for all parameter values (and consequent values of the endogenous variables w and pL) that I will
consider, yielding greater scope to entrepreneurial talent in high-quality production.
Figure 1 plots profits given by equations (2) and (4) against entrepreneurial talent z.  We
see that the most talented entrepreneurs become founders of high-quality producers, those with
less talent found low-quality producers, and agents with the least entrepreneurial talent become
workers.
10  The cutoff levels of managerial talent, denoted by  and z, are determined by z
(5) z w p Q wC z p w Q wC HH H L L L ππ (; ,) ( ,;) −= −
and
zBL(pL,w; ) - wCL = w (6). Q
It is clear from Figure 1 that exporting firms will tend to be larger than non-exporting firms
measured by value of output (sales), though if low-quality production is more labor-intensive
than high-quality production the smaller exporting firms could employ fewer workers than the
larger non-exporting firms.  It is also clear that exporting firms will tend to have higher
measured productivity than those producing exclusively for the domestic market, since they have
more talented entrepreneurs but entrepreneurial talent is unobserved.10
Turning to the demand side of the model, we want a specification that yields the result
that only high-income consumers purchase high-quality goods.  In a typical specification that
yields this result, such as Flam and Helpman (1987), consumers obtain utility from a numéraire
good, for which they choose the quantity to consume, and a vertically differentiated product, for
which they choose the quality to consume, with the quantity restricted to one unit.  In such a
specification, an increase in the price of the low-quality good, say, reduces the quantity
demanded only by reducing the number of consumers that choose the low-quality over the high-
quality good.  We generalize this specification so that an increase in the price of the low-quality
good, say, also causes a reduction in the number of units consumed by each individual consumer
that chooses this quality.  This generalization increases realism and is also important for our
results, as we shall see below.
We let the importable be the numéraire, denoting the quantity consumed by m, and
denote the quantity and quality of the vertically differentiated product consumed by x and ",
respectively.  Consumer utility is given by
u(m,x,") = [m + a
Fx
1-F'(1-F)]:("),  F > 0,  F … 1
u(m,x,") = [m + aln(x'a)]:("),  F = 1,
 where :(0) = 0, :N > 0.  Consumers can choose between a low-quality product with quality "L
and price pL and a high-quality product with quality "H and price pH.  It is then straightforward to
show that individual consumer demand for the vertically differentiated product is given by either
xL = a(pL)
-1'F  or  xH = a(pH)
-1'F.
(Note that we can obtain the result that one unit is inelastically demanded by choosing F = 4 and
a = 1.)  Denoting the consumer’s income by y, substituting either xL or xH into the consumer’s11
11The equivalent condition for F =1 is y > a{1 + [:("L)lnpL - :("H)lnpH]'[:("H) - :("L)]}.
budget constraint to solve for m, and substituting the results for m and either xL or xH into the
utility function yields
uL = [y + FapL
1-1'F'(1-F)]:("L)  or  uH = [y + FapH
1-1'F'(1-F)]:("H) ,
where we focus on the case F … 1 for the sake of brevity.  The condition for the consumer to





The right-hand side of this expression is positive for F > 1.  For F < 1, the right-hand side is
positive provided pH'pL > [:("H)':("L)]
F'(1-F).
We thus have the desired result that there exists a cutoff level of income above which
consumers purchase high-quality products and below which consumers purchase low-quality
products.  Moreover, this cutoff rises when the price of high-quality products increases and falls
when the price of low-quality products increases, as one would expect.  I assume the cutoff
income level is above the wage for all parameter values (and consequent values of w and pL) that
I will consider.  In this case the cutoff income level translates into a cutoff level of
entrepreneurial talent  .  This cutoff could be between z and  or greater than  .  It seems $ z z z
unrealistic that entrepreneurs who run firms that produce high-quality output would not be rich
enough to prefer to purchase high-quality output, so we focus on the case  z <  <  :  $ z z
 - wCL = [aF'(1-F)][:("L)pL
1-1'F - :("H)pH
1-1'F]'[:("H) - :("L)] (7). $ (, ; ) zp w Q LL π
We can see from equation (7) that  is decreasing in pL and increasing in pH, as expected:  fewer $ z
agents consume low-quality goods when their price rises and more agents consume low-quality12
goods when the price of high-quality goods rises.  We also see that  is increasing in w:  as $ z
wages rise, workers continue to consume low quality goods and entrepreneurs become poorer,
causing some to shift from high- to low-quality consumption.
With both the demand and supply sides of the model in place, we need only state the
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and for low-quality goods, we have











where N has cancelled out on both sides of equations (8) and (9).  Finally, denoting the total
quantity (and value) of imports by M, balanced trade requires








3.   Model solution and comparative statics
Equations (5) - (9) form a system of five equations in the five unknowns  , z, ,  w, and z $ z
pL.  Equation (10) then determines the volume of imports.  It is already evident from Figure 1
(which incorporates equations (5) and (6)) and from equation (7) that the cutoffs  , z, and   are z $ z
uniquely determined given values of w and pL.  To show that a solution for our model exists and
is unique, we therefore need only show that a unique solution exists for w and pL.  I will do this
by showing in the Appendix that the labor and goods market-clearing conditions (equations (8)13
12Figure 2 shows a constant slope for the labor market-clearing curve, but actually it must
become vertical as pL approaches zero because pL can no longer affect labor demand once no
entrepreneurs choose to found low-quality firms.
13This difference is determined by two opposing factors:  on the one hand, the smallest high-
quality producer has a higher fixed cost measured in labor; on the other hand, the largest low-
quality producer can realistically be assumed to have a more labor-intensive technology.  We
assume that these factors are roughly in balance for the marginal firm.
and (9)) can be plotted in w, pL space as illustrated in Figure 2.  Here I will give the intuition
behind this figure.
Consider first the labor market-clearing curve.  Increasing w decreases labor demand of
both high- and low-quality producers, whereas increasing pL increases labor demand only for
low-quality producers, so pL must increase more than w to maintain demand equal to supply. 
Hence the wage in terms of low-quality goods falls as we move up along the labor market-
clearing curve.  Moreover, we can see that this curve must intersect the horizontal axis:  as pL
goes to zero, demand for labor by low-quality producers goes to zero but demand for labor by
high-quality producers remains positive, hence the wage that clears the labor market remains
positive.
12 
Now consider the goods market-clearing curve.  Increasing w only decreases the supply
of low-quality goods whereas increasing pL  both increases the supply and decreases the demand,
so w must increase more than pL to maintain supply equal to demand.  Hence the wage in terms
of low-quality goods rises as we move up this curve.
In the Appendix, I prove:
Proposition 1:  There exist unique values of w, pL, ,  z, and   that satisfy equations (5), (6), z $ z
(7), (8), and (9), under the sufficient condition that the difference between the labor demands of
the smallest high-quality producer and the largest low-quality producer is small enough
(- MAH() 'Mw + MAL() 'Mw is small enough in absolute value).
13 z z14
Throughout the remainder of the paper we assume that the sufficient condition stated in
Proposition 1 holds.  In particular, for brevity we will not restate it in subsequent propositions.
We are now ready to do comparative static analysis.  The key parameters whose impacts
we want to examine are the price received by high-quality producers pH, which rises with trade
liberalization, and the costs of founding high- and low-quality producers, respectively CH and CL. 
I analyze decreases in these costs, representing institutional reform.
I first analyze the impact of an increase in pH, representing trade liberalization.  This
increases the demand for labor, shifting the labor market-clearing curve right, and increases the
demand for low-quality goods, shifting the goods market-clearing curve up.  The wage and the
price of low-quality goods therefore increase unambiguously.  We can then prove dpH'pH >
dw'w > dpL'pL, so that w'pH falls and w'pL rises.  The proof starts with consideration of the
limiting case of zero price elasticity of demand for low-quality goods.  We can see that for F = 4
equations (5) - (9) are homogeneous of degree zero in pH, w, and pL, i.e., that pH, w, and pL can be
increased in the same proportion without changing the values of  , z, and  that satisfy z $ z
equations (5) - (9).  Since increasing pH causes the labor market-clearing curve in Figure 2 to
shift right and the goods market-clearing curve in Figure 2 to shift up, it must be that the
intersection of these two curves moves up along a ray from the origin when pH increases.  As F
falls, the upward shift of the goods market-clearing curve in response to the increase in pH
decreases (because pL needs to increase less to clear the market for low-quality goods), so for a
negative price elasticity of demand for low-quality goods the new intersection of the labor and
goods market-clearing curves in Figure 2 must fall below the ray through the origin that passes
through their original intersection.  It follows that w increases proportionately more than pL and15
therefore, from equation (6), z must rise.  Finally, the point on the labor market-clearing curve
that intersects the ray from the origin through the original equilibrium corresponds to equi-
proportionate increases in pH, w, and pL, i.e., equations (5), (6), and (8) are satisfied by equi-
proportionate increases in pH, w, and pL.  Since the goods market-clearing curve does not shift up
far enough to put the new equilibrium at this point, w must increase proportionately less than pH. 
The fall in w'pH and rise in w'pL both ensure that  falls when pH increases.  z
We have thus proven:
Proposition 2:  Trade liberalization has an “industry rationalization” effect:  it causes the least
efficient firms to exit (dz'dpH > 0) and increases the average productivity (exclusive of sunk
costs) of the mix of firms that are present both before and after trade liberalization
(d 'dpH < 0).   Trade liberalization also increases the output of every firm that produces high- z
quality goods and reduces the output of every firm that produces low-quality goods, since
MAH'MpH and  MAL'MpL are homogeneous of degree zero in the wage and output price and trade
liberalization causes a fall in w'pH and a rise in w'pL.
I now analyze the impacts of institutional reform, i.e., decreases in CH and CL, the costs of
founding high- and low-quality producers, respectively.  A decrease in CH has a direct negative
effect on  , the cutoff talent level for high-quality entrepreneurship.  In the Appendix I derive z
the sufficient conditions that insure this direct effect will not be offset by indirect effects, so that
the number of firms producing high-quality goods increases.  A decrease in CL has a direct
positive effect on  (and direct negative effects on z and  ).  In the Appendix I derive the z $ z
sufficient conditions that insure this direct effect will not be offset by indirect effects, so that the
number of firms producing high-quality goods decreases. 
A reduction in costs common to starting high- and low-quality producers, such as a
decrease in business registration fees, can cause equal decreases in CH and CL.  This has a direct16
negative effect on z (and on  ).  In the Appendix I derive the sufficient conditions that insure $ z
this direct effect will not be offset by indirect effects, so that the total number of firms increases. 
These and other comparative static results are shown in Table 1.  The following
proposition is proved in the Appendix:
Proposition 3:  A small enough value of F is sufficient for the results shown in Table 1 to hold,
except for dz'dCL > 0 and d 'dCL > 0, which require that the ambiguous changes in w and pL do $ z
not offset the direct effects of CL on z and   in equations (6) and (7), respectively. $ z
4.   Interactions between trade liberalization and institutional reform
We begin by analyzing synergy or interference between the effects of trade liberalization
and the effects of institutional reform on the level of real income.  The value of income per capita
is equal to the sum of profits and wages per capita, which is given by






The impacts of CH, CL, and pH on GNP can then be shown to be given by, respectively,
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Equations (12) - (14) each include a term that equals the increase in the value of output of low-
quality goods in response to an increase in pL.  Since all low quality goods are consumed
domestically, this term is exactly equal to the increase in expenditure required to purchase the
low-quality goods produced and therefore does not reflect an increase in real income.  Similarly,
we want to deduct the increase in expenditure required to purchase the high-quality goods
produced from the increase in income caused by trade liberalization in equation (14).  These
adjustments yield the following changes in real income per capita or RGNP:
 (12N), dRGNP dC w dF H z =−
∞
∫
, and (13N) dRGNP dC w dF L z
z
=−∫








We see that the increases in real income resulting from decreases in CH or CL equal the value of
the labor resources saved by reducing the fixed costs of founding producers of high-quality and
low-quality goods, respectively.  By comparing equation (14N) to equation (10), we see that the
increase in real income resulting from trade liberalization, modeled here as a reduction in the real
costs of bringing exportables to the international market, equals the increase in imports that can
be purchased in exchange for exports:  the terms of trade effect.  These standard results reflect the
lack of any distortions in our model. 
We can now prove our main results.
Proposition 4:  The impact of trade liberalization on real income is enhanced by institutional
reform that reduces startup costs for producers of high-quality goods, under the sufficient18
conditions that F is small enough and that the technology for high-quality goods is productive
enough.  Proof:  From equation (14N) we see that dRGNP'dpH increases as  falls, as w falls, and z
as   rises.  According to Proposition 3, a reduction in CH has the first two effects under the $ z
sufficient condition that F is small enough.  The impact of a reduction in CH on   is ambiguous, $ z
but if it is negative we can see from equation (14N) that it will be dominated by the impact on
provided the technology for high-quality goods is productive enough, so that MAH'MpH is large z
enough relative to apH
-1'F.#
The key to Proposition 4 is the direct effect that changing CH has on the number of firms that
produce high-quality goods and hence participate in the export market.  The converse of this
proposition is equally important:  dysfunctional institutions that raise CH can make the impact of
trade liberalization on real income arbitrarily small.
A corollary to Proposition 4 is that trade liberalization and institutional reform that
reduces startup costs for high-quality producers have the property that “the whole is greater than
the sum of its parts”:  the two reforms enacted together have a greater impact on real income than
the sum of their separate impacts.
Corollary 1 (Synergy):  Under the sufficient conditions stated in Proposition 4, an increase in pH
and a decrease in CH together have a larger positive impact on real income than the sum of the
separate impacts from an increase in pH and a decrease in CH.  Proof:  Denote the initial level of
real income by RGNP(pH
0,CH
0) and the level of real income following an increase in pH and a
decrease in CH by RGNP(pH
1,CH



















the separate impact on real income of an increase in pH, and the second change equals the separate
impact on real income of a decrease in CH.#
It is important to note that Corollary 1 implies that the impact on real income of institutional
reform that reduces startup costs for high-quality producers will be greater post-trade
liberalization than pre-trade liberalization.
Institutional reforms that reduce startup costs for low-quality producers have the opposite
implications for the efficacy of trade liberalization.19
Proposition 5:  The impact of trade liberalization on real income is reduced by institutional
reform that reduces startup costs for producers of low-quality goods, under the sufficient
conditions that F is small enough, that the technology for high-quality goods is productive
enough, and that dw'dCL is small enough.  Proof:  From equation (14N) we see that dRGNP'dpH
decreases as  rises, as w rises, and as   falls.  According to Proposition 3, a reduction in CH has z $ z
the first effect under the sufficient condition that F is small enough.  It is unclear whether a
reduction in CH has the second effect, so we must assume that any decrease in the wage is
sufficiently small that it is offset by the first effect.  The direct effect of a reduction in CL is to
reduce  , but if its ambiguous effects on w and pL reversed this direct effect, the impact on $ z
dRGNP'dpH will be dominated by the impact on dRGNP'dpH through  provided the technology z
for high-quality goods is productive enough.#
The key to Proposition 5 is the direct negative effect that reducing CL has on the number of firms
that produce high-quality goods and hence participate in the export market.  
Corollary 2 (Interference):  Under the sufficient conditions stated in Proposition 5, an increase
in pH and a decrease in CL together have a smaller positive impact on real income than the sum of
the separate impacts from an increase in pH and a decrease in CL.  Proof:  The proof follows that
of Corollary 1, mutatis mutandis, and is therefore omitted.#  
Table 1 suggests that equal reductions in the startup costs for producers of high- and low-
quality goods are roughly neutral with regard to the impact of trade liberalization on real income
as given by equation (14N).  The direct effects on  of decreases in CH and CL cancel out.  The z
only unambiguous impact on dRGNP'dpH is negative, through reduction in , but this is $ z
relatively small if we maintain the condition in Propositions 4 and 5 that MAH'MpH is large relative
to apH
-1'F. 
Synergy and interference with potential growth effects of trade liberalization20
Our model can be adapted fairly easily to allow for endogenous productivity growth
through unbounded learning-by-doing.  This endogenous growth mechanism was introduced by
Lucas (1988) and applied in a small-country LDC model by Matsuyama (1992).  We can then
derive the impact of trade liberalization on the productivity growth rate, and see how that impact
changes with institutional reform.  Since unbounded learning-by-doing is only one of several
endogenous growth mechanisms that could be influenced by trade liberalization, our results
should only be taken as suggestive of how a growth effect of trade liberalization could be
enhanced or reduced by institutional reforms.
We assume that high- and low-quality output adds to cumulative production experience
per capita with weights (H and (L, respectively:
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We see from equation (15) that the output of any one firm cannot affect the accumulation of
production experience.  It follows that sectoral production experience is a purely external
economy for the firms producing the vertically differentiated good, as is standard in models of
endogenous growth through learning-by-doing.  Since AH and AL are both linear homogeneous in
and w, we can write the percentage change in cumulative production experience as Q
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14Productivity growth will drive down pL but not pH because the latter is fixed through
competition in the international market.  As a result, entrepreneurs will shift out of low-quality
production into high-quality production ( will fall). z
By equations (1) and (3), equation (16) gives the percentage change in total factor
productivity for both low- and high-quality production.  Growth of productivity will cause a
decline in the ratio of low-quality to high-quality production because preferences are non-
homothetic.
14  This may be a realistic property of our model, but it means that in general the
growth of productivity given by equation (16) will not be constant. With a slight modification,
however, our model yields a constant rate of total factor productivity growth that in turn equals a
constant rate of income growth and a constant rate of utility growth.  We can modify consumer 
preferences so that, as productivity increases, so does the “productivity” of the vertically
differentiated product in utility:  we can let the parameter a in the utility function equal 8 , so Q
that demand for the vertically differentiated product grows at the same rate as productivity and
therefore at the same rate as income, just as though preferences were homothetic.  With this
modification, equations (7) and (9) become
 - wCL = [8F '(1-F)][:("L)pL
1-1'F - :("H)pH
1-1'F]'[:("H) - :("L)] (7N) $ (, ; ) zp w Q LL π Q
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It is easy to see that the modified model, consisting of equations (5), (6), (7N), (8), and (9N), yields
a constant rate of productivity growth equal to a constant rate of income and utility growth: 22
equiproportional increases in  and w leave the solutions for  , z, ,  and  pL unchanged, so that Q z $ z
(d  'dt)' is constant by equation (16) and the percentage changes in wages, income, and Q Q
utility must all equal the percentage changes in cumulative production experience.
Total differentiation of equation (16) with respect to pH yields
(17).
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For a given value of  , the value of (d'dpH)[ (d  'dt)' ] is the same whether we use our Q Q Q
original or modified model, but for the modified model it equals the impact of trade liberalization
on the steady state rate of income growth, rather than just the impact of trade liberalization on
productivity growth at the initial level of cumulative production experience.  
From Proposition 2, we know that (d'dpH)(M  'MpH) > 0 and (d'dpH)(M  'MpL) < 0: 
~ Π H
~ Π L
for a given level of cumulative production experience, trade liberalization raises the output of
every high-quality producer and lowers the output of every low-quality producer.  Moreover, we
know from Proposition 3 that institutional reform that lowers startup costs for high-quality23
15I have simulated the model and found for the case (H = (L that (d'dpH)[ (d  'dt)' ] Q Q
increases monotonically as CH falls and can change from negative to positive.
producers raises the number of them, and also lowers the number of low-quality producers if the
unambiguous effect on  dominates the ambiguous effect on z.  Conversely, we know from z
Proposition 3 that institutional reform that lowers startup costs for low-quality producers raises
the number of them and lowers the number of high-quality producers.  We can therefore state:
Proposition 6:  Under the sufficient conditions given in Proposition 3, a decrease in CL increases
the number of firms for which trade liberalization reduces output and decreases the number of
firms for which trade liberalization raises output, and a decrease in CH increases the number of
firms for which trade liberalization raises output.  A decrease in CH also decreases the number of
firms for which trade liberalization reduces output if its unambiguous effect on  dominates its z
ambiguous effect on z. 
 
In an economy where productivity growth is driven by growth in cumulative production
experience, Proposition 6 creates a presumption that institutional reform that lowers startup costs
for high-quality producers will cause trade liberalization to increase productivity growth more (or
decrease it less), whereas institutional reform that lowers startup costs for low-quality producers
has the opposite effect.  A presumption is not a proof, however, and I have not been able to sign
the impact of a decrease in CH or CL on (d'dpH)[ (d  'dt)' ] as given by equation (17).
15 Q Q
5. Extensions of the model
A. Foreign Direct Investment24
16At the cost of additional notation, we could choose any z >  without affecting the analysis. z
We have seen that the number of firms that produce high-quality output will be increased
by institutional reform that reduces startup costs for high-quality producers.  An alternative way
to increase the number of such firms is to increase the number of foreign subsidiaries operating in
the country.  It is easy to add this feature to our model.  We simply increase the mass of agents
with entrepreneurial talent greater than  from N[1 - F() ]  t o  ( 1  +  s)N[1 - F() ] ,  w h e r e z z z
sN[1 - F( )] is the mass of foreign subsidiaries.  For the purpose of comparative statics we will z
fix  in this expression at  , i.e., we will treat the mass of foreign subsidiaries as an exogenous z z
0
variable.
16  For example, this mass could be determined by government licensing agreements.
The presence of foreign subsidiaries changes the labor market-clearing condition, but
leaves equations (5) - (7) and (9) unchanged since the foreign entrepreneurs do not become low-
quality producers nor do they consume low-quality output:
(8N). −+ − =
∞
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It follows that the only direct impact of an increase in the mass of foreign subsidiaries is to
increase the demand for labor, thereby shifting the labor market-clearing curve right in Figure 2. 
It is then straightforward to prove the following changes in the endogenous variables:
Proposition 7: An increase in s causes w, pL, and w'pL to increase, which in turn imply increases
in z and  .  The impact of s on   is ambiguous. z $ z
From Proposition 7 we see that foreign direct investment causes output of all domestic producers
to decrease, the least productive domestic firms to exit the industry, and the least productive25
domestic high-quality producers to shift to low-quality production.  The reduction in output of
domestic firms is consistent with the findings of Aitken and Harrison (1999).
The impact of an increase in foreign direct investment on real income per capita can be
shown to equal the per capita increase in wages paid to employees of existing foreign
subsidiaries, just as in standard models:
(18). dRGNP ds s dw ds w dF
z H =− >
∞
∫ () ( ) ∂∂ Π 0
Since profits earned by foreign entrepreneurs are not included in RGNP, their reduction as a result
of an increase in the wage is not subtracted from the impact on RGNP of an increase in foreign
direct investment.  The same logic implies that the presence of foreign subsidiaries alters the
impact on real income per capita of changes in other model parameters.  In particular, to compute
the impact on RGNP of trade liberalization, we must now add to the expression in equation (14N)
the expression given in equation (18), substituting dw'dpH for dw'ds in the latter.  In this respect
foreign direct investment enhances the impact of trade liberalization on RGNP, because the
increase in wages resulting from trade liberalization is no longer completely offset by lost profits
of domestic firms.  On the other hand, an increase in s tends to decrease dRGNP'dpH because it
decreases the number of domestic high-quality producers and the output of each of them.
B. Subsidizing entrepreneurship and synergy in the presence of unemployment26
17To the extent that the unemployed engage in some other activity, such as home production, the
loss of this output must be subtracted from any measured increase in real income resulting from
greater employment.
Subsidies to entrepreneurship usually take the form of programs to aid small businesses.
Since small businesses tend to be more labor-intensive than large businesses, this is consistent
with the motivation of generating employment.  In its present form our model cannot address this
motivation.  To the extent that such subsidies lead entrepreneurs to found low- rather than high-
quality producers, we have seen that they will work at cross-purposes with trade liberalization. 
However, if these kinds of programs are targeted at sufficiently small businesses (with less than
ten employees, say), it can be argued that they will not induce entrepreneurs to substitute away
from founding high-quality producers.  In fact, we will see that this kind of subsidy can be
justified in our model in the presence of a distortion that creates unemployment.  Moreover, with
such a subsidy in place, the argument for synergy (interference) between the impact of trade
liberalization on real income per capita and institutional reform that reduces startup costs for
high- (low-) quality producers is probably strengthened.
We can extend our model to two types of agents:  skilled (educated) and unskilled.  We
assume that only skilled agents can become entrepreneurs, as in Rauch (1991), so the distribution
of entrepreneurial talent among unskilled agents is irrelevant.  We also assume that there exists a
binding minimum wage w for unskilled labor that creates unemployment.  Greater employment of
unskilled labor then implies higher real income per capita, all else equal.
17 
Surprisingly few modifications are needed in equations (5) - (9) to incorporate these
changes.  All profit functions now include the parameter w.  Any fixed costs requiring unskilled
labor can be subtracted in equations (5) and (6).  Demand for low-quality goods on the part of27
18The key sufficient condition on employment, that - MAH() 'Mw + MAL() 'Mw is small in z z
absolute value, is less tenable now that it refers to skilled workers only.  However, this condition
is only sufficient, not necessary.  The assumption that the price elasticity of demand for the low-
quality good is sufficiently high is even more important than before.
19As with the result that a fall in CL decreases z, we need to make the additional assumption that
any rise in w is too small to offset the direct negative effect of the subsidy on z.  
employed unskilled workers must be added to the left-hand side of equation (9).  We will proceed
on the assumption that these modifications leave the comparative static results summarized in
Table 1 intact.
18
Income per skilled agent can now be written as 
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where the term with w gives the sum of wages paid to unskilled workers employed in high- and
low-quality production.  Consider a small subsidy to entrepreneurship that only affects skilled
agents at the margin between becoming entrepreneurs and becoming workers, i.e., it only enters
equation (6).  This small subsidy will reduce z.
19  If the positive effect of the reduction in z on
employment of unskilled workers dominates any offsetting effects operating through w and pL, the
small subsidy must increase real income per capita.  As the small subsidy becomes large,
however, there are income losses due to skilled agents becoming entrepreneurs whose
contribution to income as workers was strictly larger, while the employment benefit from
reductions in z shrinks as less talented entrepreneurs become employers.  This suggests that there
exists a positive, finite optimal subsidy to small businesses in our model in the presence of a28
minimum wage.  (The best policy to address unemployment in our modified model is a wage
subsidy, of course.)
We now consider the impact of trade liberalization on income per skilled agent expressed
in equation (11N).  For simplicity we assume that the optimal subsidy described in the preceding
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The first two terms in equation (19) are familiar from equation (14) and yield the increase in real
income per skilled agent given in equation (14N).  The next term equals the minimum wage times
the direct increase in employment of unskilled labor resulting from the higher price of output
received by high-quality producers.  The next three terms reflect the fact that trade liberalization
continues to shift the labor market-clearing curve in Figure 2 to the right and the goods market-
clearing curve up, so that w and pL will increase.  The term including dpL'dpH equals the
minimum wage times the indirect increase in employment of unskilled labor resulting from the29
higher price of output received by low-quality producers.  The terms involving the change in the
wage of skilled labor are ambiguous in sign, because firms should substitute unskilled for skilled
labor but the increase in cost should cause output to contract.  The last two terms offset each
other, leaving their net effect ambiguous. 
To summarize, if we set aside the ambiguous terms in equation (19), increased wage
income due to increased employment of unskilled workers in both high- and low-quality
production augments the positive terms of trade effect of trade liberalization on real income.  The
impact of trade liberalization on unskilled employment in low-quality production is smaller, the
higher is the price elasticity of demand for low-quality goods and hence the less their price rises
in response to the increase in demand that trade liberalization causes.  The direct effect of
institutional reform that lowers the startup costs for high-quality producers will increase
(decrease) the employment effect of trade liberalization for high- (low-) quality producers by
increasing (decreasing) the number of high- (low-) quality producers.  It follows that if the price
elasticity of demand for low-quality goods is sufficiently large, there is a presumption that the
synergy between this institutional reform and trade liberalization is enhanced by the existence of
unemployment of unskilled labor.  Under the same condition and following the same reasoning,
there is a presumption that the interference is stronger between trade liberalization and
institutional reform that reduces the startup costs for low-quality producers.
Finally, we note that since the wage of unskilled workers is fixed at w, trade liberalization
raises the wage of skilled workers relative to that of unskilled workers.  This is consistent with a
number of studies of the impact of trade liberalization on wage inequality in LDCs (see Goldberg30
and Pavcnik 2004 for a survey).  The real wage of unskilled workers actually falls because the
price of low-quality goods rises.
6.   Conclusions   
We constructed a model of a small, open less developed country that displays now well-
known responses to trade liberalization:  the least efficient firms exit and more efficient firms
expand at the expense of less efficient firms, yielding an increase in average productivity.  We
then showed that in this model institutional reform that reduces the costs of entry into high-
quality production and trade liberalization have synergistic effects on income.  In contrast,
institutional reform that reduces the costs of entry into low-quality production interferes with the
effect of trade liberalization on income.  We also used the model to analyze the impacts of foreign
direct investment and of subsidies to entrepreneurship in the presence of unemployment.
Our results should help to narrow down the focus of institutional reform efforts in less
developed countries.  In particular, they suggest that less developed countries seeking to benefit
from liberalized trade could concentrate on reform of institutions that differentially affect high-
quality producers relative to all producers.  This should be more feasible than trying to tackle the
entire universe of institutional reforms.31
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Resulting change in:  
  
z wp L z $ z
Change in parameter:
Decrease in CH – ??–  ?
Decrease in CL +–   – ??
Equal decrease
in CH and CL ? –  – ??
Increase in pH – ++++
Bold:  Change in  , z, or   results from direct effect of change z $ z
in parameter in equation (5), (6), or (7), respectively; or change in
w or pL results from reinforcing shifts of curves in Figure 2.
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Figure 1:  Determination of cutoff levels of entrepreneurial talent




        
   
                                                                                                      
                                                              
                                                               
                                                              
          
Figure 2:  Determination of equilibrium wage and price of low-quality goods
w
 pL37
20The effect of w on labor demand through  equals [MAH() 'Mw - MAL() 'Mw](d 'dw).  z z z z
Rewriting equation (5) as AH(, w) = AL(,  pL ,w), we have (holding pL constant) d 'dw =  z z z
(BL - BH)'[MAH() 'Mw - MAL() 'Mw].  Since BL - BH < 0, the result follows. z z
21We can always ensure this is true by keeping the difference between labor demand of the
smallest high-quality producer and labor demand of the largest low-quality producer sufficiently
small.  This is the sufficient condition stated in the proposition.
22Again, the sufficient condition in the proposition ensures this.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.  Consider equation (8) first.  By convexity of BH and BL in w,
demand for labor by both high- and low-quality producers falls with w, holding  and z constant.  z
This effect is reinforced by the impact of w on z, which is positive by equation (6), thereby
reducing labor demand and increasing labor supply.  It can also be shown that the effect of w on
labor demand through  is nonpositive.
20  Next, we ask how pL must change in order to eliminate z
the excess supply of labor resulting from an increase in w.  We assume that labor demand of low-
quality producers increases with the price of their output, i.e., that the cross-partial derivative of
BL with respect to w and pL is negative, in which case demand for labor by low-quality producers
rises with pL, holding  and z constant.  This effect is reinforced by the impact of pL on z, which z
is negative by equation (6), thereby increasing labor demand and reducing labor supply.  Finally,
the impact of pL on  is positive by equation (5), causing labor demand to decrease (increase) if z
labor demand of the smallest high-quality producer is larger (smaller) than labor demand of the
largest low-quality producer.  Even if the impact of pL on labor demand through  is negative, we z
assume it is dominated by its direct effect and effect through z, so that the labor market-clearing
curve in Figure 2 slopes upward.
21 
Turning to equation (9), we see that the direct effect of an increase in w is to decrease the
supply of low-quality goods, given our aforementioned assumption that the cross-partial
derivative of BL with respect to w and pL is negative.  This effect is reinforced by an increase in z
as more agents choose to become workers instead of entrepreneurs.  Finally, the impact of an
increase in w on  is positive (negative) if labor demand of the smallest high-quality producer is z
larger (smaller) than labor demand of the largest low-quality producer.  Even if the impact of w
on supply of low-quality goods through  is positive, we assume it is dominated by its direct z
effect and effect through z.
22  Next, we ask how pL must change in order to eliminate the excess
demand for low-quality goods resulting from an increase in w.  An increase in pL lowers demand
directly and by reducing   (causing agents to switch consumption from low- to high-quality $ z
goods), and increases the supply of low-quality goods by convexity of BL in pL.  These effects are
reinforced by the impacts through z and  , which both work to expand entrepreneurship in low- z
quality production and therefore increase the supply of low-quality goods.  We thus see that the
goods market-clearing curve in Figure 2 slopes upward.38
The discussion of an increase in pH in the text proves that, for the case F = 4, the goods
market-clearing curve must intersect the labor market-clearing curve from above, if the two
curves intersect.  Moreover, as F falls, it is clear from equations (8) and (9) that the goods market-
clearing curve must become flatter whereas the slope of the labor market-clearing curve is
unchanged.  It follows that the goods market-clearing curve is flatter than the labor market-
clearing curve.  This flatter slope ensures that an equilibrium will be unique if it exists.  To
establish existence, it is then sufficient to show that for the wage at which the labor market-
clearing curve touches the horizontal axis, the value of pL on the goods market-clearing curve is
positive.  This is true because a strictly positive wage means that the supply of low-quality goods
can be made arbitrarily small by reducing pL, and must therefore fall below demand for low-
quality goods by workers for some pL > 0.#
Proof of Proposition 3:
A decrease in CH has a direct negative effect on  , the cutoff talent level for high-quality z
entrepreneurship.  The labor market-clearing curve shifts left due to the direct negative effect on
labor demand, which cannot be offset by the impact on labor demand through  given the z
sufficient condition in Proposition 1.  The effect on supply of low-quality goods is negative
through  , so the goods market-clearing curve shifts up, making the change in the price of low- z
quality goods ambiguous and offsetting the decrease in the wage.  By dampening any upward
shift in the goods market-clearing curve, a sufficiently high price elasticity of demand for the low-
quality good ensures that the wage does not rise and that any rise in pL does not more than offset
the fall in CH in equation (5), so that the cutoff talent level for high-quality entrepreneurship
decreases unambiguously.  The change in the cutoff talent level for low-quality entrepreneurship
is ambiguous but should be small in any case.  The change in   is also ambiguous. $ z
A decrease in CL has a direct positive effect on  , a direct negative effect on z, and a z
direct negative effect on  .  The shift in the labor market-clearing curve is ambiguous:  it tends to $ z
shift left due to the direct negative effect on labor demand, but tends to shift right due to the
impacts on labor demand and labor supply through z.  (The impact on labor demand through  is z
small given the sufficient condition in Proposition 1.)  The goods market-clearing curve shifts
down because the impact on supply of the low-quality good is positive through both  and z, and z
the impact on demand through   is negative.  This leaves the net effects on w and pL ambiguous. $ z
We assume the price elasticity of demand for the low-quality good is sufficiently high so that any
fall in pL is too small to offset the direct positive effect on  or the direct negative effect on z.  We z
make the additional assumption that any rise in w is too small to offset the direct negative effect
on z.  (The effect of any change in w on  is small given the sufficient condition in Proposition z
1.)  Similarly, we assume that in equation (7) the direct effect dominates any offsetting indirect
effects through w and pL and   falls. $ z
A reduction in costs common to starting high- and low-quality producers, such as a
decrease in business registration fees, can cause equal decreases in CH and CL.  This has direct
negative effects on z and  .  The shift in the labor market-clearing curve is again ambiguous:  it $ z39
tends to shift left due to the direct negative effect on labor demand, but tends to shift right due to
the impacts on labor demand and labor supply through z.  The goods market-clearing curve shifts
down because the impact on supply of the low-quality good is positive through z and the impact
on demand through   is negative.  This leaves the net effects on w and pL, and hence the effect on $ z
, ambiguous. We again assume the price elasticity of demand for the low-quality good is z
sufficiently high so that any fall in pL is too small to offset the direct negative effect on z, and
again make the additional assumption that any rise in w is too small to offset the direct negative
effect on z.  Finally, we again assume the direct effect dominates in equation (7) and   falls. $ z
In the text we show that an increase in pH unambiguously increases w and pL, and that
dpH'pH > dw'w > dpL'pL, which imply a decrease in  and an increase in z.  (These results use z
the sufficient condition given in Proposition 1.)  The fact that pH and w both increase more than pL
ensures that   also rises.# $ z